• We value freedom of speech and freedom of enquiry partly as human rights, partly as means to an end, of getting society to hear things that might help it, but it doesn't wish to hear.
• The implied potential enemy of freedom of speech is society.
• Academic freedom is similar to freedom of speech and freedom of enquiry, but its implied potential enemies are both society and 'academia' itself, meaning both our fellow-academics and academic institutions such as universities.
• If academic freedom is to exist and be exercised vigorously, academia needs a culture confident enough to support and even encourage dissent.
• However, it has been forcefully argued that academia today is rapidly losing its previous independence and sense of identity.
• This is usually attributed to the external problems it faces.
• But these have been more damaging than they might be, because they are meeting little resistance from within the university sector.
• The reason they are meeting little resistance is because academics are severely divided.
• They are divided because their ideology is one of division and disunity.
• This ideology has arisen because the original and seemingly natural ideology, based on 'knowledge', proved a failure.
• Repeated attempts to use 'knowledge' led to disunity because subjects that did not meet the 'knowledge' criteria of the day were given secondclass status, and because research, a major activity of university members, had no clear rationale in a 'knowledge' culture.
• In particular, the sciences were separated from the humanities by the criterion of observation. Descriptive subjects were separated from prescriptive ones (such as ethics) by the same criterion.
• The supposedly second-class subjects developed a mind-set, sometimes hardening into ideology, of autonomy and independence.
• This island mentality has demoralized the entire campus.
Solutions
• The division of academia is based on a mistake. 'Knowledge' cannot provide unity, but enquiry and problem-solving can. • This is because enquiry and problem-solving have the same logical structure in all subject areas.
• Enquiry involves making tentative judgments, discovering the logical consequences of these judgments, and trying to revise them when, inevitably, inconsistencies arise.
• These same strategies are employed in subjects as different as particle physics, ethics, and history.
• The logic referred to is the logic of natural language, allowing sophisticated reasoning about tentative, qualitative, and counterfactual judgments. This is explicit in humanistic subjects like history.
• In 'hard' sciences, the making of judgments is usually done at the prepublication stage, but it is just as necessary and prevalent.
• Thus enquiry is one single enterprise.
• It is the natural unifying concept for academia.
• Mere intellectual assent to enquiry as a unifying concept is not enough to create the strong culture required for academic freedom, and the things academic freedom is meant to achieve.
• If academia is to do its job of helping society solve its most difficult problems, the unity among academics, or enquirers, must regain the almost religious character that the deliberate search for knowledge had at its inception.
• Universities in this new age will have a specific character.
o Both research and teaching will be dominated by enquiry and its needs. o Research will be oriented towards problems, and will frequently straddle subject areas. o Administrative barriers between research areas, such as the establishment of departments, will be allowed only grudgingly and kept to a minimum. o In order to retain autonomy, the university will be funded mainly by fees and donations; the level of funding from other sources will be limited by statute.
The talk
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this series, Roger, and thank you all for coming. I hope you all have my bullet-point summary.
Perhaps I should say right away that 'the university' in my title stands for universities as a whole. There is nothing in the talk specifically about our own University of Birmingham.
The title of Roger's series is 'Academic Freedom and Research and Learning
Cultures'. The reason I'm speaking to you is that I've thought a lot about research and how it is done, and how it relates to academic culture. The title pulls in two other subjects, academic freedom and learning, which are bound to interest all of you as well as myself, and force us to ask how they are related to research and culture. I won't say much about learning and teaching, since freedom, research, and culture will give us quite enough difficulties. But what we discover about these three concepts will also bring clarity about teaching, as we'll see near the end of the talk. * * * An eminent previous speaker in this series, John Child (Child, 2007) (Newman, 1852) which defined the idea of a liberal UK university for many decades. Newman had seen the university as being driven primarily by teaching, but teaching aimed at general cultivation of mind. An overarching view was to be developed, which Newman describes dramatically as 'knowledge impregnated by reason'. It is this broad vision of the world that will eventually release students from the shackles imposed by limited, specialist knowledge, and this liberation is the justification of the term 'liberal', in 'liberal education'.
According to Maskell and Robinson, the word 'education' in Newman's sense has now lost its original meaning. 'Education' has become fatally confused with 'training'. The word 'education' is retained, however, for its capacity to confuse taxpayers, who probably think that training should be a matter for the private sector.
The confusion matters increasingly as a child grows older: So it's in tertiary education that the confusion wreaks the greatest havoc, according to Maskell and Robinson. Insofar as the genuine university is based on Newman's concept of liberation, it gradually ceases to exist, because those who seek to define university policy fail to understand or express just what it is that universities are, at heart, no longer possessing the words and distinctions they need. (Readings, 1996) Thinking about my own experience of the different levels of the UK education system, I can recognize scraps of 'liberal education' and perhaps 'literary culture' playing a part at times, but the principal value system of academia I have noticed has been that of the absence of a central value or a common standard. Academics by and large accept the incommensurability of different viewpoints as an insuperable barrier to the development of a strong group identity. And without that unity we are impotent. There can be few less impressive sights today than a band of peevish academics on the rampage.
Readings quotes the witty suggestion that a university faculty is "a loose association of people united by a common interest in parking." If this is as far as our unity goes, then it's unsurprising if alien values swamp the campus.
Nature abhors a vacuum.
Once, we did have a common value, a seemingly natural one for academics:
the value of knowledge. This value ran its course at the centre of academic culture, faltered, and died. Our word 'academic' derives from Plato's academy, in which Plato's distinction between knowledge and mere opinion was crucial.
Both Plato and his teacher Socrates sought knowledge: Plato claimed to have attained it. Their attitude to knowledge was one of religious intensity. To introduce a theme I'll return to later: are we sure it's impossible to recapture this intensity?
Whether or not the tension between the humanities and the sciences was already apparent in the fourth century BCE, in the differing temperaments of Plato and his pupil, Aristotle, it would certainly become so in the second millennium CE, in Catholic Europe.
Let us begin the story around 1100. Then, there seemed to be a touchstone of knowledge, provided by the teachings of the Bible and of certain scholars of the ancient world, supported by an authoritative mechanism of interpretation, safeguarded by a religious hierarchy. But shortly after 1100 previously unknown and disturbing ancient Greek texts started to arrive. These had been lovingly preserved for centuries by Muslim scholars, and were now being translated into the common Catholic academic language of Latin.
These texts created a crisis. Did they contain 'knowledge'? Were they 'orthodox'? Did they not contradict each other and existing 'knowledge'? The scope and richness of this expanded literature posed endless problems for scholars, some of whom started to conduct their own, independent investigations, as the Greeks themselves had done, long ago. Unfortunately, this wonderful moment in the history of enquiry became misinterpreted as the discovery of a new and conclusive gold standard for knowledge.
The new idea was to replace the authority of the text by the authority of 'observation'. Surely, people couldn't argue about the observed, because everyone observed the same thing. Observation transcended mere 'opinion'.
And so a new orthodoxy of 'knowledge' was born. We call this orthodoxy empiricism, and a form of empiricism still has a large following among scientists.
Let me explain why the 'knowledge' idea is so inherently disruptive. Any supposed touchstone of knowledge, be it the text or the observation or what you will, creates an inside, an elite group of subjects that can certify their contents according to the touchstone. And it creates an outside, a group of second-class subjects allowed onto campus only on sufferance, if at all. For instance, the arrival of empiricism brought academia's greatest division, between the observation-based sciences and the humanities. The sciences had 'knowledge', the humanities had only 'opinion'.
The other reason that 'knowledge' is disruptive is that it gives a derogatory account of research and enquiry. The job of a researcher can only be to apply the touchstone, so that knowledge can shine forth. A menial task, requiring patience and the ability to follow orders, rather than creativity. And this is if you're lucky enough to work in the touchstone-certified elite. If you're in an uncertified subject, there doesn't seem to be any rationale for research whatever.
Researchers, under empiricist domination, indeed led a troglodytic life, often hidden from sight in the passive voice. The test tube was held over the Bunsen burner, but no one knew who held it there, or why they bothered.
Yet the troglodytes came to resent their troglodytic status. Humanistic troglodytes didn't want to be denigrated any more, scientific ones wanted their creativity respected. The beginnings of their self-assertion coincided with the final collapse of the great European empires, so the troglodytes naturally cast their empiricist oppressors in the role of imperialists, and themselves as newly liberated post-colonial states. Their ideology was, naturally, self-determination and anti-imperialism. 'Knowledge' was not the central organizing principle of research, they thought. There was no central organizing principle: only imperialists would try to impose one. 'Knowledge', therefore, had no meaning, unless it was a synonym for 'usefulness', whose nature varied from disciplinary island to disciplinary island. Islands that felt their autonomy threatened developed ingenious defences. They devised their own languages.
They wrote long hieroglyphic incantations. The islands were havens of peace and love. Of peace, because whenever disharmony threatened, some of the inhabitants sailed off to found their own island nearby. Of love, because they read each others' papers, which no-one else could understand.
By these sorry means, the current psychological state of play in academia was gradually accomplished. In our moment of post-imperial triumph, we found our scattered academic archipelago threatened by much more serious oppressors than the ones we had just escaped. Our ideologies of autonomy and isolation, so successful in beating off the assaults of our fellow academics, proved ill-adapted to beating off those of administrators, accountants, efficiency experts, students, journalists, and governments. According to my meta-narrative, research is unified not by the concept of 'knowledge', which at first seemed such an obvious choice, but by 'enquiry', the search for knowledge. If knowledge exists, its content differs greatly from subject to subject. But enquiry has the unity provided by the unity of logic. I therefore believe that there are no grounds for the final segregation of academic subjects. There is no Berlin Wall separating moral philosophy from particle physics.
Another way I think my position is unusual is that it stresses two things simultaneously that are usually seen as opposed: individual judgment and universal logic. 'Cold' logic, as it is sometimes described. I shall argue that the logic used in research, which is the logic of natural language, is a major source of the warmth, flexibility and power of language itself.
Putting these ideas together, here is my view of research.
• Knowledge has unity, in the sense that enquiry, the search for knowledge, uses logically similar methods whatever problem we are trying to solve.
There are no grounds for the structural segregation of enquiry.
• Enquiry is conducted by individuals, from their own blinkered starting points, according to their own fallible judgments, towards conclusions which no-one else is compelled to accept. Our own judgment is inescapably sovereign -how can we defer to another's judgement, unless
we first judge that we must do so? In this sense our search for knowledge is entirely subjective.
• Yet we cannot believe what we like, if we are committed to consistent reasoning in natural language. For that language uses a powerful logic, which can tease out remote and possibly unwelcome implications of our views and, more positively, allow us to develop logically-structured discourse using tentative and qualitative judgment, counterfactual analysis, degrees of belief, and degrees of endorsement..
• Accordingly, we researchers face demands which are hard to reconcile even though our own judgment is sovereign, to us. Our colleagues can use natural logic, on which we all rely, to pick away at our positions. We must meet the demand for logical consistency. We can be asked to resolve our own uncertainties. We can be asked to resolve the clashes of world-view with those of others, which involves mastering their reasoning. We all know that research is difficult, should be difficult. The warring demands for greater consistency, greater scope, greater certainty explain why this is so.
But let me relate this to the historical debate about knowledge.
What of the empiricists, who thought in the early days that they had a touchstone of knowledge? The empiricist tradition was long and yielded some of the world's most famous thinkers. Let us benefit from their thought by looking at one of the most developed and sophisticated forms of empiricism, the twentieth-century philosophy of Karl Popper. (See for instance Popper 1934 Popper , 1963 Popper , 1974 So, did Popper really think that the scientific method is a matter of touchstones and troglodytes? On the face of it, there was no reason for him to think this, because he took the momentous step in the history of thought of dethroning 'knowledge', and substituting enquiry. To Popper, what we think we know is always subject to revision. Our most interesting and wide-ranging theories can never be proved right, though they might be shown wrong. Plato was repudiated. Socrates ruled once more.
Popper argued that the point of science was not that it had correct theories, but that it could make progress by working on its own vulnerable areas. He was the first to see the fallibility of science not as an embarrassment, but as its most characteristic and interesting trait. Yet Popper remained an empiricist.
Although he had given up 'knowledge' he still retained a touchstone, the falsifiability criterion, which guaranteed the continued elite status of science.
And I'm afraid that despite putting research and enquiry at the heart of his philosophy, he nonetheless failed to emancipate the troglodytes. He did recognize an upper class of researcher, a creative class that devised new theories to be tested. But if the predictions of the tests failed, the theory was either to be rejected -still in the passive voice -or adjusted according to rules that Popper and his successors tried to lay down, in increasingly complicated detail. This makes Popper's proposals rigidly impersonal, as if written for funding councils, rather than individual scientists.
What I wish to do is:
• Retain Popper's suggestion that enquiry and fallibility are the correct organizing concepts in the theory of knowledge.
• Retain his belief that logic plays an important role in enquiry, and that logic is common to all subjects.
• Deny his assumption that science is driven, ultimately, by observation, and suggest that science and all enquiry are driven, ultimately, by the judgment of the enquirer. What matters for me as an enquirer is not what I observe, but what I judge I observe. I can judge not only the colour of a flame, but also the morality of an action or the probability of a historical event. And I can change my mind, of course, about all three.
• And deny his narrow conception of logic as based on true, false, and uncertain, substituting 'natural logic', the immensely subtle and flexible logic used in natural language. This is in fact the language used by all academics, physicists as much as historians, whatever they later publish in their articles.
To show how these recommendations demolish the walls between subjects, let me discuss their effect on Popper's touchstone, his famous falsifiability criterion. We can never prove the claim that all swans are white, but the observation of a single black swan will refute it. To Popper, this provided a definition of science. A scientific theory is one that is refutable, that admits it can be shot down by the black swan strategy. The contrast is with theories that seem compatible with whatever is observed. Popper gave the example of Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis, whose apparent strength he said, their ability to explain everything, is in fact their greatest weakness.
If I admit that the logic of falsification operates only in science, then my main thesis, the logical unity of enquiry, will itself be shot down. So I will show how the logic works in a subject that we probably all admit is non-scientific, namely ethics. Suppose that I claim that stealing is always wrong. You ask me whether it is wrong to steal food for a starving child. If I judge not, then I am in exactly the black swan situation, logically speaking. My universal moral theory is refuted, for me, by a particular moral fact.
Of course, the refutation I have just described works only when I accept that stealing in dire need is allowable. But the case with the black swan is the same: it is the observer's acceptance that a black swan exists that creates the fertile crisis in his or her world-view, not the black swan itself, nor even an observation of a black swan. Of course, science uses observation frequently, while moral philosophy uses it hardly at all. But I am not claiming that all subjects have the same subject matter, only that they are all driven by the mechanisms of logic and judgment. That your judgment is about the colour of a swan, and mine is about the morality of a particular action, affects the logical structure not a jot.
The example illustrates how, in the absence knowledge, the enquirer's judgment becomes central. This is as true in physical science as in ethics. Yet This language and logic of uncertainty and entirely fallible judgment is just as necessary for research into mathematics as for research into history. If it were not, progress in science could be achieved automatically, by some sort of logical or probabilistic calculus. Researchers can be wrong, they can judge wrongly, and probably do so most of the time. Yet without judgment and the language of judgment, they would be unable to function at all.
In short, I believe that although the problems we study in a university certainly require markedly different styles of attack, enquiry is an enterprise unified by human agency, human judgment, radical uncertainty, natural language, natural logic, theorizing, fallibility, the desire for progress, and -one hopesby social contact between enquirers or researchers. To me, this unity is academia's greatest potential asset. But a different type of university is possible, the university of enquiry, whose struggle to be born we have hardly noticed, in our long-standing state, our dogma, of disunity and demoralization.
What sort of academic community could support such a university? I think it exists, partially, already. We support the ideal of enquiry not just in our own subject, but in academia and society as a whole. Our support is more than intellectual; we have internalized it as a value: we share some of the passionate attitude of Socrates and Plato towards the search for knowledge. I would like to see these instincts better channelled and organized. Intellectuals should be more ready to unite in a formal movement aiming at the defence and promotion of free enquiry. No beliefs about other matters would be required of members, and none prohibited, so members could remain members of many other types of secular or religious organization.
Like election monitors, the movement as a whole would not take sides. Its main job would be to monitor the quality of enquiry in society, including its universities. Many academics do such things as individuals and on particular subjects. I would like to see them unite, and promote enquiry generally. We need the psychological support of belonging to an organization other than our work-place.
What of a particular university, of enquiry? For instance, is it research-led or teaching-led? That's an easy one. It's enquiry-led. Research, which etymologically means something like 'intensive search' is almost a synonym for enquiry. Teaching, whatever the subject, is seen in the university of enquiry mainly as an education in the art of enquiry and critical thought. This type of education is seen as an absolute priority, to which even syllabus content must be sacrificed if necessary. The university realizes in any case that many students will use little of the 'knowledge' they are taught. But they will always need to assess arguments, their own and others', make reasoned judgments, and seek answers to problems. They will need the mental resources to beat off attractive but irrational assaults on their mental integrity.
Which subjects and disciplines are studied in the university of enquiry? Which are in; which out? The university's decision-makers smile, and gently remind us that the university is based primarily on enquiry and problem-solving, and only secondarily on subject-matter. Any subject can in principle be studied, if
there are interesting problems to be solved within it, or about it. They frankly admit that what counts as 'interesting' is a matter of their own judgment. They do not pretend that such decisions can be made impersonally.
The university of enquiry tries to get its members to orient themselves towards problems rather than techniques. It knows that to an academic with only a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. It regards its division into academic subjects as an evil sometimes necessary, perhaps for teaching purposes, or where there are research clusters, but one to be minimized. It knows that rigid subject divisions were a characteristic of the age of islands, to which it is determined never to return.
No economist (which I am) with a conscience (which I have, sporadically), could ignore the question of finance in the university of enquiry. Donations and fees are crucial, because it is axiomatic that the dependence on government funding and contract work is kept within strict limits. These are laid down in the university's statutes, in order to protect its autonomy, without which its continued existence would have little point. How realistic it is to hope for donations on a generous scale depends on how strong a sense of belonging the university is able to convey to its future alumni and alumnae, how closely it identifies with some ideal of enquiry within the wider society. * * *
In this talk I've tried to argue that academic freedom needs to be supported by a unified culture; that academic culture is currently disunited; and that the only natural concept around which it can unite is enquiry. Thank you all for your patience in hearing me out.
